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Abstract The increasing international mobility of high-skill individuals is often seen
as posing a threat to domestic social welfare, by limiting the ability of governments to
tax these individuals and redistribute to the poor. In this paper, we examine a simple
dynamic nonlinear income tax model without commitment. In this setting, it is shown
that the threat of emigration by high-skill individuals facilitates redistribution and
increases social welfare in the short-run, and has no effect on social welfare over the
long-run.
1 Introduction
Optimal tax analyses typically assume that individuals cannot emigrate to avoid
domestic taxation. Such an assumption is, however, increasingly viewed as being unre-
alistic, especially as it relates to high-skill individuals. When high-skill individuals are
immobile, redistributive taxation must take into consideration that these individuals
may change their labour supply along the intensive margin. That is, high-skill individ-
uals may work less, thus reducing the amount of income available for redistribution.
When high-skill individuals are internationally mobile, they have the additional option
of changing their labour supply along the extensive margin, i.e., they may emigrate.
An often-employed method to capture the threat of emigration is to introduce type-
dependent participation constraints into the optimal tax problem; see, e.g., Osmundsen
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(1999), Krause (2009a), Simula and Trannoy (2010, 2012), and Lehmann et al. (2014).
Naturally, these additional constraints reduce the level of social welfare attainable.
In this paper, we introduce the threat of emigration by high-skill individuals into
a two-period nonlinear income tax model without commitment. As in the related lit-
erature, this threat is captured by introducing a participation constraint for high-skill
individuals. However, we show that the introduction of the high-skill type’s participa-
tion constraint facilitates redistribution and increases social welfare in the short-run,
and has no effect on social welfare over the long-run. One may wonder how it is
possible that the introduction of a binding constraint into an optimisation problem
does not reduce the maximised value of the objective function. The participation con-
straint appears in period 2 and it does reduce the maximised value of the objective
function (social welfare) in that period, but the specific manner in which social wel-
fare is reduced—by limiting redistribution—enables a higher level of social welfare
to be obtained in period 1. Thus social welfare summed over both periods remains
unchanged. The intuition can be summarised as follows. In period 1 the govern-
ment does not know each individual’s skill type, and therefore implements standard
(incentive-compatible) nonlinear income taxation which induces individuals to reveal
their type. However, high-skill individuals know that if they reveal their type in period
1, they lose their information advantage and will be subjected to first-best taxation
in period 2. This means that high-skill individuals must be offered a very attrac-
tive tax treatment in period 1 to reveal their type, to compensate them for having
to face first-best taxation in period 2. Accordingly, the ability of the government to
redistribute in period 1 is severely limited. However, the threat of emigration reduces
the extent of redistribution possible in period 2, meaning that high-skill individuals
require less compensation in period 1 to reveal their type. This enables the govern-
ment to implement more redistribution in period 1, which correspondingly increases
first-period social welfare. The threat of emigration limits redistribution and reduces
social welfare in period 2, but optimal taxation balances the short-run benefits against
the long-run costs. Thus the threat of emigration has no effect on the level of social
welfare summed over both periods.
In terms of previous results, the paper most closely related to ours is that by Leite-
Monteiro (1997). He also finds that increased international mobility may enhance
redistribution, but his model is entirely different to ours. In Leite-Monterio’s model,
the government can always implement first-best personalised lump-sum taxes, and
changes in the country’s skill composition after migration takes place is what makes
enhanced redistribution a possibility. By contrast, in our model the participation con-
straint ensures that no one migrates, so the skill composition remains unchanged. Our
paper is also related to the literature on dynamic Mirrlees (1971) nonlinear income
taxation without commitment, e.g., Roberts (1984), Apps and Rees (2006), Brett and
Weymark (2008a), Krause (2009b), Berliant and Ledyard (2014), and Guo and Krause
(2011, 2013, 2014, 2015a, b). In dynamic Mirrlees models, the question arises as
to whether the government can or cannot commit to not using skill-type informa-
tion revealed by individuals in earlier periods when it implements taxation in latter
periods. A common theme in the literature is the highlighting of how different and
counter-intuitive optimal policy can be when the commitment assumption is relaxed.
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The present paper provides another example of a result that, at first glance, appears
quite counter-intuitive.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
and the structure of optimal taxation, while Sect. 3 presents and discusses our result.
Section 4 discusses other possible solutions to the optimal tax problem, and what
these would imply for our result. Section 5 concludes, and the proof of our result is
contained in an appendix.
2 A simple model
We consider a two-period model with a unit measure of individuals and with the fol-
lowing timing. In period 1 the government knows that there are φ ∈ (0, 1) high-skill
individuals and (1 − φ) low-skill individuals in the economy, but it does not know
any individual’s skill type. The government therefore implements standard second-
best (incentive-compatible) nonlinear income taxation, under which each individual
is willing to reveal their type. Then, in period 2, the government knows each indi-
vidual’s skill type, and is tempted to use this information to implement first-best
redistributive taxation. However, high-skill individuals have the option of emigrating,
so redistribution is limited by the high-skill type’s participation constraint. We assume
that emigration is only possible in period 2. The implications of this assumption are
discussed in Sect. 4, though it is consistent with the observation that individuals tend
to be immobile in the short-run (period 1), but mobile in the long-run (period 2). For
simplicity we assume that individuals do not save or borrow, so the only link between
the periods is the revelation and use of skill-type information.
Specifically, the government in period 2 solves the following problem. Choose tax





















where cti is type i’s consumption (or post-tax income) in period t, y
t
i = wi l ti is type i’s
pre-tax income in period t, with wi denoting type i’s wage rate and lti denoting type
i’s labour supply in period t. It is assumed that wH > wL > 0 and that wages remain
constant over time. Equation (2.1) is a utilitarian social welfare function, where u(·)
is increasing and strictly concave and the individuals’ utility function is quasi-linear
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in labour.1 Equation (2.2) is the government’s budget constraint,2 and Eq. (2.3) is the
high-skill type’s participation constraint. High-skill individuals can obtain a utility
level of VH by emigrating, which is their reservation utility. We assume that VH is
sufficiently high such that Eq. (2.3) is binding, i.e., the threat of emigration is effective.
The solution to programme (2.1)–(2.3) yields the value functionW 2(φ,wL , wH , VH ),
which is the level of social welfare attainable in period 2.
In period 1 the government does not know each individual’s skill type, and therefore
implements second-best (incentive-compatible) nonlinear income taxation. It chooses




















+ δVH ≥ u(c1L) −
y1L
wH
+ δ max[Û 2H , VH ] (2.6)




is the utility that a high-skill individual would obtain in
period 2 from the low-skill type’s tax treatment. That is, c2L = c2L(φ,wL , wH , VH )
and y2L = y2L(φ,wL , wH , VH ) come from the solution to programme (2.1)–(2.3). We
use δ ∈ (0, 1) to denote the discount factor.
Equation (2.4) is the first-period utilitarian social welfare function. The government
in period 1 might care about the level of social welfare in period 2, but its choice of
〈c1L , y1L 〉 and 〈c1H , y1H 〉 cannot affect the level of social welfare attainable in period
2, which is W 2(φ,wL , wH , VH ). Therefore, the government in period 1 acts as if
maximising only first-period social welfare. Equation (2.5) is the government’s first-
period budget constraint,whileEq. (2.6) is the high-skill type’s incentive-compatibility
constraint.
In order for a high-skill individual to be willing to choose 〈c1H , y1H 〉 in period 1
and thus reveal their type, the utility they obtain from this choice in period 1 plus
the utility they obtain in period 2 (which will be their reservation utility, VH ), must
be greater than or equal to the utility they could obtain by mimicking. A high-skill
individual has twomimicking strategies. First, a high-skill individual could choose the
low-skill type’s tax treatment in period 1—effectively announcing to the government
that they are low-skill—and then not emigrate in period 2. In this case, because in
1 The literature on the comparative statics of optimal nonlinear income taxes (e.g., Weymark 1987; Brett
and Weymark 2008b, 2011; Simula 2010) has shown that results are generally obtainable only when the
utility function is quasi-linear. As we make use of comparative statics methods, we also assume that the
utility function is quasi-linear.
2 We assume that the government cannot save or borrow, and that its revenue requirement is zero. Thus
taxation is implemented only for redistributive purposes.
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period 1 they announced that they are low-skill, the government in period 2 will treat
them as low-skill and give them the low-skill type’s tax treatment. The mimicking
high-skill individual would therefore obtain utility level Û 2H in period 2. Second, a
high-skill individual could choose the low-skill type’s tax treatment in period 1 and
then emigrate in period 2, to avoid being treated as low-skill in period 2. In this case,
they obtain utility level VH in period 2. Which of these mimicking strategies is best
depends upon Û 2H and VH . The first is better when Û
2
H > VH , and the second is better
when Û 2H < VH . Note that if Û
2
H ≤ VH , the incentive-compatibility constraint (2.6)








, which is the same as the condition required for
incentive compatibility in static models. However, as we explain below (in Sect. 3.1),
Û 2H > VH will hold unless VH is so high as to undo a key feature of dynamic nonlinear
taxation without commitment.
We make the standard assumption that any individual who is indifferent between
truthfully revealing their type and mimicking will tell the truth. Therefore, no mim-
icking occurs in the solution to the optimal tax problem. We also omit the low-skill
type’s incentive-compatibility constraint, because we make the common assump-
tion that the redistributive goals of the government create an incentive for high-skill
individuals to mimic low-skill individuals, but not vice versa.3 As discussed ear-
lier, emigration is only possible in period 2, so a participation constraint does not
appear in period 1. The solution to programme (2.4)–(2.6) yields the value function
W 1(φ,wL , wH , Û 2H , VH , δ), which represents the level of social welfare attainable in
the first period.
3 The threat of emigration and social welfare
It is shown in the appendix that:
Proposition Suppose Û 2H > VH . In our dynamic nonlinear income tax model without
commitment, the threat of high-skill emigration increases social welfare in period
1 (∂W 1(·)/∂VH > 0), decreases social welfare in period 2 (∂W 2(·)/∂VH < 0),
and has no effect on social welfare summed over the two periods (∂W 1(·)/∂VH +
δ∂W 2(·)/∂VH = 0).
The proposition implies that the threat of high-skill emigration facilitates redistri-
bution and increases social welfare in the short-run, and has no effect on the level of
social welfare attainable over the long-run. The intuition follows from a key feature of
dynamic nonlinear income taxation without commitment. In the absence of a partici-
pation constraint, high-skill individuals know that if they reveal their type in period 1,
they will be subjected to first-best redistributive taxation in period 2. Therefore, high-
skill individuals must be offered an attractive tax treatment in period 1 if they are to be
3 In fact, high-skill individuals generally have a stronger incentive to mimic when the government cannot
commit than when it can commit. This makes it theoretically possible that ‘pooling’ taxation may be
optimal; see, e.g., Brett and Weymark (2008a), Krause (2009b), and Guo and Krause (2015a, b). In this
paper, however, we focus only on ‘separating’ taxation, under which high-skill and low-skill individuals
always receive different tax treatments. The effects of pooling taxation are discussed further in Sect. 4.
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willing to reveal their type, to compensate them for the unattractive tax treatment they
will face in period 2. This restricts the government’s ability to redistribute and raise
social welfare in period 1. Now consider the effects of the participation constraint.
The participation constraint means that high-skill individuals obtain more utility in
period 2, because theywill emigrate unless they receive at least their reservation utility.
Therefore, high-skill individuals now have less incentive to conceal their type in period
1. Accordingly, the government can now offer high-skill individuals a less attractive
tax treatment in period 1 and still obtain skill-type information. Taken together, this
implies that social welfare is lower in period 2 (due to the participation constraint),
but higher in period 1 (as the incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed). Moreover,
social welfare summed over the two periods remains unchanged, because optimal tax-
ation balances the short-run benefits vis-a-vis relaxation of the incentive-compatibility
constraint against the long-run costs of the participation constraint.
3.1 A numerical example
As our proposition assumes that Û 2H > VH , in this subsection we provide a numerical
example of our result. We also explain why our assumption, and hence our result, will
be valid unless VH is so high as to undo a key feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation
without commitment.
In the numerical example we assume that the utility function takes the form ln(cti )−
lti . This is based on Chetty (2006), who concludes that a reasonable estimate of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is one (log utility). The OECD (2014) reports that
approximately one-third of adults have attained tertiary level education. We assume
that these individuals are high-skill and the remainder are low-skill, i.e., we set φ =
1/3. Fang (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2007) estimate that the college wage premium
is approximately 60%. We therefore normalise the low-skill type’s wage rate to unity
(wL = 1), and set the high-skill type’s wage rate at wH = 1.6. Following common
practice, we assume an annual discount rate of 4%. However, as most individuals
work for around 40 years of their lives, we take each period to be 20 years in length.
An annual discount rate of 4% then implies a 20-year discount factor of δ = 0.456.
Table 1 reports the parameter values used in the numerical example, as well as the
results for the cases of VH = −1.0 and VH = −0.9.
It can be seen that as the value of the participation constraint is increased from
VH = −1.0 to VH = −0.9, the discounted sum of social welfare over the two periods
remains unchanged (at −1.208). Social welfare increases in period 1 and decreases
in period 2. These findings are an example of our proposition, since the assumption
Û 2H > VH is satisfied for the parameters chosen.
For the case of VH = −1.0, it can be seen that the utility a high-skill individual
obtains in period 1 (−0.432 by choosing 〈c1H , y1H 〉) is greater than what they could
obtain by mimicking (−0.710 by choosing 〈c1L , y1L 〉). Likewise, for VH = −0.9, the
utility a high-skill individual obtains in period 1 (−0.478 by choosing 〈c1H , y1H 〉) is
greater than what they could obtain by mimicking (−0.687 by choosing 〈c1L , y1L 〉). As
discussed earlier, a key feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation without commitment
is that high-skill individuals know that they will be subjected to first-best taxation in
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Table 1 Numerical example
u(cti ) − lti = ln(cti ) − lti
Parameter values:
ϕ 0.333 wL 1.000
δ 0.456 wH 1.600
VH = −1.0 VH = −0.9
Low-skill utility: period 1 −1.082 −1.046
High-skill utility: period 1 −0.432 −0.478
Mimicker utility: period 1 −0.710 −0.687
Low-skill utility: period 2 −0.624 −0.704
High-skill utility: period 2 −1.0 −0.9
Mimicker utility Uˆ2H : period 2 −0.390 −0.444
Social welfare: period 1 −0.866 −0.856
Social welfare: period 2 −0.749 −0.769
Social welfare: total −1.208 −1.208
period 2 if they reveal their type in period 1. Accordingly, high-skill individuals must
be offered an attractive tax treatment in period 1 to reveal their type, as compensation
for the unattractive tax treatment they will receive in period 2. Therefore, compared to









is a general feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation without








would hold in static settings. It is
only if VH was so high as to undo this general feature of dynamic nonlinear taxation
without commitment that our assumption would no longer be valid.
3.2 A general condition
In this subsection, we provide a general condition under which Û 2H > VH , assuming
log utility. It is shown in the appendix that:





+ φ[ln(wH ) − 1] > VH
(3.1)
For any particular value of the participation constraint, Eq. (3.1) can be used to check
if Û 2H > VH . For example, one can check that (3.1) is satisfied for the parameters used
in our numerical example.
4 Discussion and some caveats
Ourproposition is drivenby an important feature of dynamic nonlinear income taxation
without commitment, namely, that high-skill individuals must be offered an attractive
tax treatment in period 1 to reveal their type. This restricts redistribution in period 1 and
reduces social welfare. In fact, it is possible that the welfare cost is sufficiently severe
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that it would be better if the government did not induce skill-type revelation. That is, it
may be optimal for the government to implement pooling taxation. This involves the
government offering a single tax treatment to all individuals, and therefore skill-type
information is not revealed.
Our analysis implicitly assumes that pooling taxation is not optimal. If pooling
taxation is optimal, our result no longer holds. However, the question arises as to
how likely it is that pooling becomes optimal. Pooling taxation is quite severe in
that it imposes the same tax treatment on everyone. Guo and Krause (2015b) show,
for a range of empirically-plausible parameter values, that pooling taxation is not
optimal in either two-period or infinite-horizon settings. Indeed, they show that even
the autarkic equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare than does pooling
taxation. Therefore, while it is possible that pooling taxation is optimal, it is less likely
than regular separating taxation (under which our result holds).
Perhaps a more serious caveat follows from our assumption that the participation
constraint appears only in period 2. If one assumes that high-skill individuals are
immobile in the short-run and mobile in the long-run, then our assumption seems
reasonable. However, if a participation constraint for high-skill individuals was intro-
duced into period 1, and it rendered the incentive-compatibility constraint slack, then
our result would no longer hold. For this to occur, the value of the first-period partic-
ipation constraint would have to be quite high, since incentive-compatibility requires
that high-skill individuals be offered a generous first-period tax treatment (as discussed
earlier). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that our result would not hold in that case. It
is also worth noting that for sufficiently high values of the participation constraint, it
might be better to simply let high-skill individuals emigrate. But we do not consider
that possibility here.
Finally, nonlinear income taxation a la Mirrlees (1971) can be viewed as an appli-
cation of principal-agent theory, so one may wonder if an analogue of our result would
apply in other applications of principal-agent theory in dynamic settings. For example,
repeated contracting vis-a-vis insurance, regulation, or employment agreements.4 An
important difference is that in nonlinear income taxation, the principal (the govern-
ment) seeks to maximise the aggregate welfare of the agents (the individuals), rather
than having its own separate objective. That said, in all dynamic applications without
commitment, the agent-type with the information advantage must be compensated to
give-up that advantage. So it seems possible that an analogue of our result may apply
in these other applications as well.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown, using a simple dynamic nonlinear income tax model
without commitment, that the threat of high-skill emigration can increase social wel-
fare in the short-run and have no effect on social welfare over the long-run. While this
result may be viewed as being primarily of theoretical interest, it also provides a new
example of how restrictions on policy instruments that are clearly welfare-reducing
4 Laffont andMartimort (2002) provide a textbook treatment of principal-agent theory and its applications.
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when the government can commit, may in fact be beneficial when the government
cannot commit.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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6 Appendix
Proof of the Proposition The Lagrangian corresponding to programme (2.1)–(2.3)
is:




















where λ2 > 0 and α2H > 0 are Lagrange multipliers. The first-order conditions are:
(1 − φ)u′(c2L) − λ2(1 − φ) = 0 (A.2)
−(1 − φ) 1
wL
+ λ2(1 − φ) = 0 (A.3)
φu′(c2H ) − λ2φ + α2Hu′(c2H ) = 0 (A.4)
−φ 1
wH








− VH = 0 (A.7)

















Under the assumption that Û 2H > VH , the Lagrangian corresponding to programme
(2.4)–(2.6) is:


























where λ1 > 0 and θ1H > 0 are Lagrange multipliers, and use is made of the fact that




. The first-order conditions on y1L and y
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H are, respectively:
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where the last equality makes use of (A.2) and (A.3).


















From (A.7) and using (A.14) we obtain:
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From (A.6) and using (A.13)–(A.15) we obtain:
y2L − c2L −
φc2H
1 − φ +
φy2H




1 − φ (A.16)










where use has been made of (A.10) and (A.11). This shows that ∂W 1(·)/∂VH > 0.
Finally, Eqs. (A.8) and (A.17) imply that ∂W 1(·)/∂VH + δ∂W 2(·)/∂VH = 0. 
unionsq
Derivation of Equation (3.1)
Assuming log utility, Eqs. (A.2)–(A.7) can be solved to yield:
c2L = wL and y2L = wL −
φwH
(1 − φ) [ln(wH ) − 1 − VH ] (A.18)




. Using (A.18) and after some algebraic manipulation,
it can be shown that:





+ φ[ln(wH ) − 1] > VH (A.19)
which is Eq. (3.1). 
unionsq
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